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Abstract
Background: Equitable financing is a key objective of health care systems. Its importance is
evidenced in policy documents, policy statements, the work of health economists and policy
analysts. The conventional categorisations of finance sources for health care are taxation, social
health insurance, private health insurance and out-of-pocket payments. There are nonetheless
increasing variations in the finance sources used to fund health care. An understanding of the equity
implications would help policy makers in achieving equitable financing.
Objective: The primary purpose of this paper was to comprehensively assess the equity of health
care financing in Malaysia, which represents a new country context for the quantitative techniques
used. The paper evaluated each of the five financing sources (direct taxes, indirect taxes,
contributions to Employee Provident Fund and Social Security Organization, private insurance and
out-of-pocket payments) independently, and subsequently by combined the financing sources to
evaluate the whole financing system.
Methods:  Cross-sectional analyses were performed on the Household Expenditure Survey
Malaysia 1998/99, using Stata statistical software package. In order to assess inequality,
progressivity of each finance sources and the whole financing system was measured by Kakwani's
progressivity index.
Results:  Results showed that Malaysia's predominantly tax-financed system was slightly
progressive with a Kakwani's progressivity index of 0.186. The net progressive effect was produced
by four progressive finance sources (in the decreasing order of direct taxes, private insurance
premiums, out-of-pocket payments, contributions to EPF and SOCSO) and a regressive finance
source (indirect taxes).
Conclusion: Malaysia's two tier health system, of a heavily subsidised public sector and a user
charged private sector, has produced a progressive health financing system. The case of Malaysia
exemplifies that policy makers can gain an in depth understanding of the equity impact, in order to
help shape health financing strategies for the nation.
1. Background
The financing of health care is a subject of major concern
throughout the world. Health care financing is the activity
of raising or collecting revenue to pay for the operation of
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a health care system [1]. The conventional categorisations
of finance sources for health care are taxation, social
health insurance, private health insurance and out-of-
pocket payments. There are nonetheless increasing varia-
tions in the finance sources used to fund health care. Dif-
ferences in social health insurance are: implementation
either at the national or community level, eligibility either
on a mandatory or voluntary basis, and contribution
either by the individual or the employer. Variations in
out-of-pocket payments are its formality (or informality)
and function either as co-payment, co-insurance or full
cost. Hence the emergence of finance sources such as com-
munity health insurance and informal payment.
Policy makers are considering or implementing various
financing strategies in order to strengthen health care
financing. Such implementation is likely to have a sub-
stantial impact on the equity of health care financing.
Equity involves a value judgment of fairness on the
(accepted magnitude of) variations from the (expected
degree of) equality in the population. Equity in health
care financing is assessed by the degree of inequality in
paying for health care between households of unequal
Ability To Pay (ATP) [2]. It is usually represented by the
extent to which health care is financed according to ATP.
Equitable financing is a key objective of health care sys-
tems. Its importance is evident in policy documents, pol-
icy statements, the work of health economists and policy
analysts. The commitment to equitable financing is
expressed in the policy statements by linking finance to:
ATP in Denmark and the UK; equity in Ireland, Portugal
and Spain; solidarity in Italy and the Netherlands; and tax
financing in Switzerland [2]. Furthermore, the accordance
of health payments to ATP is regarded as an important
objective in the finance of health care in Belgium, France,
Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain and the UK
[3,4]. Policy makers in various countries are seen to com-
mit towards financing health care according to ATP. The
Ministry of Health (MOH) in Malaysia subscribes to this
commitment by proposing that the nation's contribution
to the new national health financing scheme be related to
ATP [5].
This paper presents an equity assessment of the health
financing system, and draws together all finance sources
in Malaysia to evaluate the whole financing system. The
second section presents the Malaysian health care system.
The third section summarizes the methodology regarding
the data, variables and analysis on all Malaysian finance
sources and the system. The fourth section presents the
empirical results on progressivity for the finance sources
and financing system. The fifth section discusses the pro-
gressivity, methodological concerns, comparisons with
other studies and the policy implications. The sixth sec-
tion draws the conclusions.
2. Malaysian Health Care System
The fundamental principle of the Malaysian health care
system is that accessibility to health care not to be related
to ATP, particularly in the event of sickness [6]. The gov-
ernment is concerned with the performance of the health
care system, whose primary purpose is to improve health
of the nation [7]. This stems from the understanding that
health represents the human capital, which is the central
thrust to sustainable economic growth and development
of the country. The Malaysian health care system has been
improving over time, such that a higher standard of health
status has been achieved with the relatively limited
resources available to the health sector. For example,
throughout the period of 1990 to 2005, life expectancy at
birth increased significantly (males from 69.0 years to
71.8 years, females from 73.5 years to 76.2 years), the
infant mortality rate has fallen (from 13.5 to 5.1 per 1,000
live births), whilst maternal mortality rate has been held
steady (at 30 per 100,000 live births) [5]. Such improve-
ment in health status has been achieved within the range
of 2.0% to 4.0% of GDP being spent on health services in
Malaysia. The total health expenditure was 3.1% of GDP
during the HES 1998/99 (with per capita total expendi-
ture on health at 112 US$ average exchange rate or 261
international dollar rate), and has increased to 3.8% of
GDP in 2003 (with per capita total expenditure on health
at 163 US$ average exchange rate or 374 international
dollar rate) [8]. Malaysia was ranked at 49 from 191 WHO
member countries in the World Health Report 2000 [9],
which assessed the overall health system performance
against three objectives of good health, responsiveness
and fair financial contribution. Malaysia performed
unsatisfactory in fair financial contribution, with ranking
at 122–123 from 191 WHO member countries, whilst
moderately in the other two objectives (the level of good
health was ranked at 89 whilst distribution at 49 from
191, the level of responsiveness was ranked at 31 whilst
distribution at 62).
2.1 Delivery of Health Care
A dual health care system, with both the public and pri-
vate health services, co-exists in Malaysia. The government
provides health care services to the nation through public
hospitals and health clinics throughout the country. The
services range from outpatient curative care to preventive
and promotion of health. The main public health pro-
vider is MOH that provides primary care, secondary care
and tertiary care through various types of health facilities
(such as general hospitals, district hospitals and health
clinics). There were 122 MOH hospitals (with a total of
30,021 beds), 6 special medical institutions (with 4,740
beds), 809 health clinics, 1,919 rural clinics, 89 maternalInternational Journal for Equity in Health 2008, 7:15 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/7/1/15
Page 3 of 14
(page number not for citation purposes)
and child health clinics, and 146 mobile clinics in 2005.
An open-door policy in regard to general outpatient serv-
ices and hospital admissions has been practiced by the
public health sector. Access to specialist services is none-
theless controlled through a national system of referral.
Specialist services are available at designated hospitals
(such as national referral hospital in the capital, the state
hospital and selected district hospitals). Referral of
patients for specialist services is to the nearest facility if
patients cannot be managed at general outpatient facili-
ties. The National Quality Assurance Programme was
implemented to maintain, improve and evaluate the qual-
ity, efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of public
health services [7]. The Clients Charter commits providers
to providing a specified standard of services explicitly and
can be used in order to monitor the quality of services and
enhance customer satisfaction.
Public health services are heavily subsidized by the gov-
ernment. Primary care services at health clinics are deliv-
ered almost free of charge, whereby each patient is
charged a nominal fee of RM 1 (equivalent to US$0.31 in
2007) for each outpatient visit based on Fees (Medical)
Order 1976. Secondary and tertiary care services provided
at hospital facilities are also highly subsidized by the gov-
ernment. A total of RM 7.8 billion (equivalent to US$2.4
billion) was allocated to the MOH for funding the public
health services in 2005 [8]. The fees collected by the MOH
nonetheless only constitute about 2% of the MOH budget
in 2004, which means that the Government subsidized
about 98% of the health services provided by the MOH
[10].
Private health providers complement the medical services
provided by the government. Private health providers
mainly focused on curative services and include general
practitioner clinics, medical centres to private hospitals
[7]. Private hospitals exist in a variety of sizes (with the
number of beds ranging from 17 to 2,358). There were
218 private hospitals (with a total of 10,542 beds), and an
estimate of about 5,000 private general practitioner clinics
(providing a range of primary health services) in 2004
[11].
The emergence of a private health sector is driven by
demand. Affluent members of the population expect high
quality health services and create the demand for a private
sector. The quality of care at private facilities was per-
ceived to be of high quality [7]. Newly built private hospi-
tals are equipped with large, ultramodern and lavish
medical technology. The prompt services at the private
general practitioners' clinics also offer convenient medical
services in particular to the nearby population [7].
The private facilities are monitored and regulated by the
Malaysian government to ensure quality service and cost
control. The regulatory environment was strengthened by
the implementation of Private Health Care Facilities and
Services Act 1998 enforced on the private sector. It
expresses specific requirements for facility standards and
the assurance of quality services in accordance with the
National Quality Assurance Programme [5].
The private sector charges user fees on patients for utiliz-
ing health services in order to operate and maintain their
facilities. The private sector offers lucrative remuneration
packages to medical practitioners upon joining their
organization. The expense of utilizing health services at
private facilities (represented by their user fees) is higher
than at public facilities. Access to private health services is
inevitably limited to the richer segments of the popula-
tion that can afford to pay high user fees as out-of pocket
payments or co-payments (with coverage of private insur-
ance)[7].
Some private hospitals are established as charitable insti-
tutions, in parallel with the principles of a caring society.
This principle is one of the nine challenges in the Vision
2020 [7], which articulated the government's vision of a
developed and united nation. Price discrimination is prac-
ticed in some of the charitable institutions, by charging a
premium on those who can afford for cross-subsidization
to the poor. The price discrimination practice is nonethe-
less becoming increasingly difficult to sustain due to the
need to compete with commercial hospitals [12].
2.2 Financing of Health Care
Malaysia is a predominant tax financed system that the
government contributes significantly towards financing
health services. The national (macro) level expenditure
showed that the government subsidise 58.2% of the fund-
ing in public health sector whilst the balance of 41.8% is
financed by the private sector in 2003 [8]. A tiny 0.8% of
general government revenue consisted of social security
contributions. The majority of private finance sources
were accounted for by out-of-pocket payments (73.8%)
with a minor component of private insurance (13.7%).
The balance 12.5% of private finance sources is unre-
ported in the WHO 2006 [9].
Malaysian health services are ultimately funded through
the general population by tax payments, and contribu-
tions to EPF (Employee Provident Fund) and SOCSO
(Social Security Organization). The Ministry of Finance
(MOF) collects general taxes (as direct and indirect taxes)
to finance the public services including health care. The
employed population also contributes to EPF. The pri-
mary purpose of EPF is to create savings for old age for the
contributor and his family, nevertheless, 30% of the indi-International Journal for Equity in Health 2008, 7:15 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/7/1/15
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vidual's contributions can be withdrawn for reimburse-
ment of health care expenditure [13]. The employed
population earning less than RM 3,000 further contrib-
utes to SOCSO that provides medical benefits for work-
related injuries of members [14]. Private insurance is vol-
untarily purchased by individuals, who pay different pre-
miums depending on the type of health insurance and
level of coverage. Out-of-pocket expenses represent pay-
ments incurred at the point of utilization at health facili-
ties. The households' financial contributions to the health
care system in Malaysia are shown in Figure 1. The five
sources of funding (direct taxes, indirect taxes, EPF contri-
butions and SOCSO contributions, private insurance pre-
miums and out-of-pocket payments) are channelled
directly or indirectly through financial intermediaries to
either public or private health facilities that coexist in par-
allel.
The utilisation of public health services is almost free,
only nominal charges are levied upon certain services
whereby the patients have to pay from out-of-pocket.
Conversely, utilising private health services require out-
of-pocket payments, or co-payments with private health
insurance coverage. The affluent or those that can afford
to pay user fees have a choice of switching to the private
sector whilst the poor rely on the public sector. Private
health services were perceived as of higher quality with
reduced waiting time [7].
3. Methodology
The assessment on equity in financing health care draws
on established techniques from the public finance litera-
ture. The starting point of assessment is the notion that
health care financed according to ATP is considered equi-
table. To judge whether the health payment undermines
or contributes to the equitable financing goal, one has to
Households' Financial Contributions to Health Care System in Malaysia Figure 1
Households' Financial Contributions to Health Care System in Malaysia.
Private Health Insurance 
Company 
Private Health Facilities 
Employee Provident Fund 
(EPF) 
Population 
Public Health Facilities 
Taxes (direct, indirect) 
EPF Contributions
Out-of-pocket payments 
Private insurance premiums
SOCSO Contributions
Social Security 
Organization (SOCSO) 
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assess how closely in practice health payment is linked to
ATP.
Progressivity measures the deviation from proportionality
in the relationship between health payment and ATP [15].
It reveals the extent of inequality in paying for health care
services between households of unequal ATP. A health
payment is progressive (regressive) if it accounts for an
increasing (decreasing) proportion of ATP as ATP rises. A
progressive (regressive) system means that the individuals
or households with greater ATP are paying more (less)
proportionally in financing health care. Health care
financing systems are proportional if individuals or
households with different ATP are spending the same pro-
portion of ATP in financing health care.
The Kakwani's progressivity index [16], widely used in
public finance, is a frequent tool of assessment for equita-
ble financing. It is defined as ηk = C - G, C is the concen-
tration index for payments and G is the Gini coefficient
for income (or consumption, expenditure) [16]. C equals
-1 if the entire financial burden is concentrated in the
hands of the poorest person, and 1 if the financial burden
is concentrated in the hands of the richest person. G
equals 0 where there is perfect income equality (every
individual has the same income), and 1 where there is
perfect income inequality (one individual has all the
income whilst every other individual has zero income).
ηk is positive in a progressive system and ηk is negative in
a regressive system. The value of ηk ranges from -2 (= -1-G)
in the most regressive system to +1 (= 1-G) in the most
progressive system. Kakwani's progressivity index at 0
means that the system is proportional and health pay-
ments account for the same proportion of income, irre-
spective of the individuals' income [17].
The Kakwani index was computed directly in a single step
from convenient regression in the following form [15]:
where σR
2 is the sample variance of the fractional rank var-
iable, h is the health payment variable, η is the health pay-
ment variable's mean, y is the ATP variable, μ is the ATP
variable's mean, and R is the household fractional rank in
the ATP distribution. The Ordinary Least Squares estimate
of β is the Kakwani index.
3.1 Household Expenditure Survey Malaysia 1998/99
This research employed data from the Household Expend-
iture Survey (HES) Malaysia 1998/99. The HES is a
nationally representative survey conducted by the Depart-
ment of Statistics Malaysia every five years, which aims to
collect information on the levels and patterns of con-
sumption expenditure by selected households for a com-
prehensive range of goods and services [18]. Although the
survey's primary purpose is to capture household expend-
iture patterns, the cardinal measures collected have the
potential for equity analysis in health care financing.
The HES 1998/99 was carried out for a period of 12
months, from July 1998 to June 1999. In the survey, a
household is defined as a person or group of persons that
stays in the selected dwellings (or 'living quarters') for at
least 16 nights during the reference month. The selected
households were asked to record the daily purchase of all
individual items for a month, they were also interviewed
individually [18]. A sample size of 9,198 households was
employed in this research.
Two crucial variables for this research are ATP and health
payments. Consumption was adopted as the preferred
measure of ATP for Malaysia, as a developing country
where living standards are contributed substantially from
the household production [19]. The World Bank [15]
assured that consumption or even expenditure is regarded
as a better measure of ATP than income in the case of
developing countries. The conceptual and practical con-
siderations are firstly, consumption is smooth over time
whilst income fluctuates. Secondly, informal labour mar-
kets and home production are common and widespread
in developing countries, therefore many households may
have multiple, variable and changing sources of income
[15]. The sensitivity of the Kakwani index towards other
proxies of ATP measures, such as gross income and non
food consumption are illustrated in the empirical results.
The five finance sources in the Malaysian health financing
system are direct taxes, indirect taxes, contributions to EPF
and SOCSO, private insurance premiums and out-of-
pocket payments. Out-of-pocket payments and private
insurance premiums are reported in the HES Malaysia
1998/99. Direct taxes and contributions to EPF and
SOCSO are derived whilst indirect taxes are estimated
from the expenditure variables in the HES Malaysia 1998/
99. The basis of derivation of these five health payments
are summarised in Table 1.
Macro weights of these five health payments are required
to assess the overall progressivity of the whole health
financing system. Macro-weights established from the
MNHA 1997–2002 [20] were used for the main analysis
(shown in Appendix 1), as recommended by the World
Bank [15].
3.2. Adjustment for the Composition of Households
To obtain adult equivalent estimates for progressivity
analysis, it is necessary to adjust the household estimates
2
2 σ
ημ
αβ μ R
hy
R [] −= ++International Journal for Equity in Health 2008, 7:15 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/7/1/15
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of aggregate expenditure (in the HES data) to reflect
household size and composition [15]. Additionally, the
HES data should also be adjusted for economies of scale
that arise from sharing public goods in the households.
These two adjustments can be conducted by applying an
equivalence scale. The number of adult equivalents (AE)
in the household was defined as:
AE = (A+αK)θ
where A is the number of adults in the household, K is the
number of children, α is the cost of children, and θ is the
degree of economies of scale [15].
Deaton and Zaidi [21] proposed a value between 0.3 to
0.5 for α and near unity for θ in developing countries. A
higher α represents an increased cost of children in devel-
oped countries, whilst a higher θ represents an increased
proportion of private consumption (such as food) in the
household. Nonetheless, the procedure of identifying
equivalence scale has been difficult and arbitrary [21].
Furthermore, an equivalence scale has not been applied in
analyzing the HES by the DOS in Malaysia. For the pur-
pose of this research, an adult equivalence scale of 0.5 was
used to represent the developing state of an upper middle
income country such as Malaysia, in parallel with the
study on Asian countries by O'Donnell et al 2005 [22]. An
economies of scale at 1 is used to represent the equal pro-
portion of private consumption for each adult in the
household (which represent a neutral state without econ-
omies and diseconomies of scale). The implication of
using different adult equivalent scale and different econo-
mies of scale was examined in sensitivity analyses.
3.3 Progressivity Analysis
Kakwani's index was first calculated for each five finance
sources. The progressivity of the whole financing system
was subsequently established by weighting the progressiv-
ity (using the macro-weights) of the five finance sources.
In order to test the sensitivity of Kakwani's index towards
the choice of ATP measures and the application of equiv-
alent scales, sensitivity analyses were conducted using
three scenarios. First, per household amounts for pay-
ments and consumption (instead of per adult equivalent
amounts for payments and consumption with the appli-
cation of equivalence scale) were used to calculate Kak-
wani's index. Second, income (instead of consumption)
was used as the proxy of ATP. Third, non food consump-
tion (instead of consumption) was employed as the proxy
of ATP. Additionally, sensitivity analysis using three dif-
ferent incidence assumptions were conducted for three
scenarios (details in Section 4.1).
4. Empirical Results
The net progressivity of the five finance sources in the
whole health financing system, assessed by Kakwani's
indices, is shown in Table 2. Kakwani's indices were
obtained directly from the convenient regressions. The
Kakwani's index is interpreted in terms of its directions
(positive or negative), its quantum, and its significance.
The positive sign of four Kakwani's indices reveal the pro-
gressivity of all finance sources except indirect taxes. The
largest positive value using the Kakwani's index showed
that direct taxes were the most progressive, followed by
private insurance premiums and out-of-pocket payments.
The lowest positive value of contributions to EPF and
SOCSO showed that they were the least progressive. The
significance of progressivity (or regressivity) is revealed for
almost all finance sources except private insurance premi-
ums. Private insurance premiums are not significantly
progressive because Kakwani's index was not significantly
different from zero at 95% confidence interval, which
indicates that the null of proportionality cannot be
rejected. Conversely, direct taxes, out-of-pocket payments
and contributions to EPF and SOCSO were significantly
progressive whilst direct taxes are significantly regressive
as shown by a 95% confidence interval. In addition to the
Kakwani's index, concentration indices by finance sources
for Malaysia are also presented in Table 2. The concentra-
tion indices with the largest positive values for direct taxes
indicate that direct taxes were the most concentrated on
high income groups. Direct taxes were followed by private
insurance premiums, out-of-pocket payments, contribu-
tions to EPF and SOCSO, and indirect taxes, in order of
decreasing value.
Table 1: The basis of derivation of Health Payment Measures
Health payment measures Basis of derivation from the survey
Direct taxes Represented by expenditure on income tax.
Indirect taxes Estimated expenditure on sales taxes. Sales taxes estimated from household expenditure (on rates ranging 
from 5% to 15% depending on the types of goods).
Contributions to EPF and SOCSO Represented by the summation of employee's and employer's contributions to EPF, SOCSO and others.
Private insurance premiums Reported expenditure on accident and health insurance premiums.
Out-of-pocket payments Reported expenditure on pharmaceutical products, therapeutic appliances and equipments, medical and dental 
services, and hospital services and treatments.International Journal for Equity in Health 2008, 7:15 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/7/1/15
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4.1 Sensitivity Analysis
Four sensitivity analyses were conducted on Kakwani's
indices. First, sensitivity analysis on three different inci-
dence assumptions are shown in Table 3, in which Kak-
wani's index was 0.217, 0.204 and 0.220 for case 1, 2 and
3, respectively. These positive values indicate that the
whole health financing system was progressive regardless
of the assumption made. The Kakwani's indices for the
whole health financing system, with uncertainty intervals
(calculated as the deviation from case 1) of merely ± 0.01,
are comparatively less sensitive than individual finance
sources (with an uncertainty interval of up to ± 0.10 for
direct taxes and private insurance premiums).
Second, sensitivity analysis on different equivalence scale
and different economies of scale are shown in Table 4.
Kakwani's indices were within the range of 0.01 from the
base case adopted in this research (adult equivalent scale
at 0.5 and economies of scale at 1). The sensitivity analysis
shows that the different scales are within the uncertainty
interval of ± 0.01 and make little difference to the esti-
mated Kakwani's indices.
Third, Kakwani's indices were recalculated for three sce-
narios (of different ATP measures) and shown in Table 5.
All three scenarios produce slightly different Kakwani's
indices. The progressivity results for the five finance
sources remain the same, except out-of-pocket payments
(but the change is insignificant). Out-of-pocket payments
were found to be mildly regressive when income was used
as an ATP measure (instead of mildly progressive when
consumption was used in the base scenario). There was no
consistent pattern in the changes of Kakwani's index. All
Kakwani's indices have an uncertainty interval of ± 0.10
except indirect taxes and out-of-pocket payments (with a
greater uncertainty interval of ± 0.15). The choice of ATP
measures and the conversion to equivalent adult do have
an impact on resultant Kakwani's indices, and should be
made explicit while interpreting results and drawing pol-
icy implications.
In the first scenario using actual payments and consump-
tion (without the application of equivalence scale), con-
tributions to EPF and SOCSO were slightly more
progressive; indirect taxes were less regressive; whilst the
other three finance sources were more progressive. In the
second scenario using income as the ATP measure, contri-
butions to EPF and SOCSO were slightly more progres-
sive; indirect taxes were more regressive; and the other
three finance sources were less progressive. Nonetheless,
out-of-pocket payments have become mildly regressive
(instead of progressive in the base scenario). In the third
scenario using non food consumption as the measure,
indirect taxes were slightly more regressive and the other
four finance sources were less progressive.
Table 2: Cumulative Proportion of Health Payments by Consumption Deciles and Kakwani's indices, Malaysia 1998/99
Indices Consumption Direct taxes Indirect taxes Contributions to EPF 
and SOCSO
Private insurance 
premiums
Out-of- pocket 
payments
Gini/
Concentration 
index
0.4051* 0.8003* 0.3273* 0.4862* 0.6985* 0.5094*
Robust standard error - 0.0072 0.0642 0.0094 001735 0.0363
95% Confidence 
intervals
- 0.6745–0.9261 0.3089–0.3457 0.4435–0.5289 0.3585–1.0385 0.4383–0.5805
Kakwani indices - 0.3952* -0.0779* 0.0811* 0.2934 0.1043*
Robust standard error - 0.0620 0.0088 0.0204 0.1726 0.0358
95% Confidence 
intervals
0.2737–0.5167 -0.0607- 
(-0.0951)
0.0412–0.1210 0.2917–0.2951 0.1018–0.1068
Note: * significantly different from zero at 5%.
Table 3: Kakwani's Indices under Three Set of Incidence Assumptions on Unallocated Revenue
Finance sources Kakwani by source Weighted Kakwani's index Uncertainty interval
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
Direct taxes 0.3952 0.1474 0.1289 0.0723 ± 0.10
Indirect taxes -0.0779 -0.0179 -0.0216 -0.0121 ± 0.05
Contributions to EPF and SOCSO 0.0811 0.0004 0.0004 0.0010 ± 0.05
Private insurance premiums 0.2934 0.0857 0.0857 0.1420 ± 0.10
Out-of-pocket payments 0.1043 0.0010 0.0104 0.0172 ± 0.05
Kakwani's indices for total health finance - 0.2166 0.2038 0.2204 ± 0.01International Journal for Equity in Health 2008, 7:15 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/7/1/15
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Fourth, in addition to the base case in Table 3, sensitivity
of Kakwani's indices for three scenarios under three differ-
ent incidence assumptions of unallocated revenue are also
reproduced and shown in Table 6. The financing system
appears to be progressive for all four scenarios and all
three cases, with Kakwani's indices ranging from 0.129 to
0.246. The most progressive system was produced in the
scenario of actual payments and consumption. The sce-
nario of income measure and non food consumption
measure estimated a slightly less progressive financing
system, in which non food consumption produced the
least progressive system with the lowest Kakwani index.
The sensitivity analysis confirms that the different inci-
dence assumptions yield uncertainty interval between ±
0.01 and ± 0.03, and hence, make little difference to the
estimated Kakwani's indices.
Table 4: Kakwani's Indices on different adult equivalence scales and different economies of scale
Case Adult equivalent scale Economies of scale Kakwani's indices
Direct taxes Indirect taxes EPF and SOCSO Private insurance Out-of-pocket payments
1 0.5 1 0.3952 -0.0779 0.0811 0.2934 0.1043
2 0.5 0.75 0.3951 -0.0766 0.0811 0.2884 0.1034
3 0.5 0.5 0.3825 -0.0750 0.0813 0.2826 0.1021
4 0.4 0.75 0.3950 -0.0778 0.0813 0.2932 0.1042
5 0.3 0.75 0.4001 -0.0789 0.0802 0.2980 0.1047
Range of indices from Case 1 ± 0.01 ± 0.01 ± 0.01 ± 0.01 ± 0.01
Table 5: Concentration Indices and Kakwani's Indices for Sensitivity Analysis on Equivalence Scale and ATP Measures
Description ATP measures Direct tax Indirect tax Contribution to EPF 
and SOCSO
Private insurance 
premium
Out-of- pocket 
payment
1. Base Scenario (Payment Per Adult Equivalent on Consumption Measure)
Gini/CI 
(Robust SE)
0.4051* (0.0072) 0.8003* (0.0642) 0.3273* (0.0094) 0.4862* (0.0218) 0.6985* (0.1735) 0.5094* (0.0363)
Kakwani's indices 
(Robust SE)
- 0.3952* (0.0620) -0.0779* (0.0088) 0.0811* (0.0204) 0.2934 (0.1726) 0.1043* (0.0358)
2. Sensitivity Analysis
i. Per Household Amounts for Payment and Consumption (instead of Per Adult Equivalent Amounts for Payments and Consumption)
Gini/CI 
(Robust SE)
0.3839* (0.0066) 0.8055* (0.0628) 0.3102* (0.0077) 0.4540* (0.0191) 0.7007* (0.1654) 0.5088* (0.0342)
Kakwani's indices 
(Robust SE)
- 0.4216* (0.0610) -0.0737* (0.0079) 0.0700* (0.0188) 0.3168 (0.1646) 0.1249* (0.0341)
ii. Income Measure instead of Consumption Measure
Gini/CI 
(Robust SE)
0.4595* (0.0103) 0.8231* (0.0641) 0.2782* (0.0094) 0.5878* (0.0220) 0.6792* (0.1739) 0.4539* (0.0339)
Kakwani's indices 
(Robust SE)
- 0.3636* (0.0585) -0.1813* (0.0116) 0.1283* (0.0175) 0.2197 (0.1709) -0.0056 (0.0341)
iii. Non Food Consumption Measure instead of Consumption Measure
Gini/CI 
(Robust SE)
0.4762* (0.0090)
0.8008* (0.0642) 0.3194* (0.0095) 0.4971* (0.0218) 0.6970* (0.1733) 0.5013* (0.0363)
Kakwani's indices 
(Robust SE)
-
0.3246* (0.0615) -0.1568* (0.0096) 0.0209 (0.0203) 0.2208 (0.1721) 0.0251 (0.0361)
Uncertainty interval ± 0.15 ± 0.10 ± 0.10 ± 0.10 ± 0.15
Note: Gini/CI is Gini coefficient or Concentration index; robust SE is robust standard error.International Journal for Equity in Health 2008, 7:15 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/7/1/15
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5. Discussion
The Malaysian health financing system was progressive in
1998/99, with a Kakwani index of 0.217. The households
contribute progressively towards direct taxes, contribu-
tions to social insurance, private insurance premiums and
out-of-pocket payments. Indirect taxes emerged as the
only regressive finance source. All of the five finance
sources were concentrated in the richer groups. The rich
make greater payments in relative terms through all five
financing mechanisms than the poor, making them pro-
gressive in their impact.
The financial burden of the four progressive health pay-
ments was concentrated among the higher income groups
as compared to proportionality. Direct taxes were the
most progressive finance source with the highest concen-
tration level, in which the rich make a much greater pro-
portion of their ATP compared to the poor. The income
taxes (which represent direct taxes) schedule was progres-
sive and concentrated in the higher income groups (who
are taxed at a higher rate). Private insurance premiums
were the second most progressive finance source. The
affluent voluntarily purchased private insurance (and
chose policy with premiums in accordance with their
ATP), in order to protect and safeguard themselves against
catastrophic health payments. Out-of-pocket payments
were the third progressive finance source. Households'
probably adopt selective behaviour while purchasing
medical products in a diverse market and seeking health
services in a parallel existence of public and private health
providers. The switch to private health services by the rich
and the predominant reliance on subsidized public health
services by the poor resulted in slightly progressive out-of-
pocket payments. The fourth progressive source was social
insurance contributions which was probably the result of
the offsetting effects from the mildly progressive EPF con-
tributions and regressive SOCSO contributions. The EPF
contribution schedule appeared to be mildly progressive.
Conversely, the imposition of an upper earning limit for
the SOCSO contributions and the ineligibility of the afflu-
ent as members make SOCSO contributions regressive.
The consequences of the ineligibility of the affluent as
SOCSO members are regressivity. Thus progressivity
nonetheless is captured overall due to the aggregation of
EPF and SOCSO contributions by households in the HES
1998/99.
In contrast, indirect taxes emerged to be the only regres-
sive finance source. Indirect taxes were slightly concen-
trated within the richer groups and were less than
proportional. Sales taxes (represented by indirect taxes)
are levied depending on the type of goods, irrespective of
the households' ATP. The poor have low ATP and end up
spending a high proportion of their ATP on purchasing
goods. The poor consequently paid more indirect taxes
proportionally than the rich.
5.1 Methodological Challenges
One of the methodological challenges is to congregate the
data from the MNHA and the HES. The original MNHA is
employed to establish the macro weights, which are sub-
sequently used to weight the households' contribution
towards financing health care services. At one end, MNHA
categorized finance sources at the macro (or national) per-
spective. At the opposite end, the HES collected health
expenditure at the micro (or household) level. Inevitably,
some MNHA finance sources at the macro level could not
be allocated down to the household level in the HES. This
difficulty in combining macro and micro level data was
exacerbated by the aggregation of the general government
revenue. Assumptions therefore had to be made about
their distribution in generating macro-weights from the
MNHA. Sensitivity analysis nonetheless reveals few differ-
ences between three incidence assumptions of their distri-
bution. This seems to suggest that Kakwani's index is an
appropriate tool that is capable of producing consistent
results within acceptable levels of uncertainty.
The distribution of unallocated finance sources was
unknown and their incidence was assumed in establish-
ing the macro weights in this research. The overall taxes in
developing countries were in fact found to be broadly pro-
gressive by Shah and Whalley [23]. They [23] also found
that export duties were progressive; import duties were
regressive or proportional; excise duties were generally
progressive; value added taxes (which is quite similar to
Table 6: Kakwani's Indices for whole Financing System given Sensitivity Analysis on Three Set of Incidence Assumptions
Sensitivity Analysis Kakwani's indices Uncertainty interval
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
Payments Per Adult Equivalent on Consumption Measure (Base scenario) 0.2166 0.2038 0.2204 ± 0.01
Per Household Amounts instead of Per Adult Equivalent Amounts 0.2456 0.2224 0.2405 ± 0.02
Income Measure instead of Consumption Measure 0.1581 0.1325 0.1453 ± 0.02
Non Food Consumption Measure instead of Consumption Measure 0.1521 0.1295 0.1462 ± 0.03
Differences from choice of measures ± 0.06 ± 0.07 ± 0.07 -
Note: The largest difference is 0.087 if comparing all cases to Case 1 in Base Scenario, and 0.1161 if comparing all cases among each other.International Journal for Equity in Health 2008, 7:15 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/7/1/15
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the regressive sales tax in Malaysia) were regressive; whilst
company taxes have mixed progressivity (regressive for
the lowest income groups, proportional for the middle
income groups and progressive for the high income
groups) in developing countries.
5.2 Comparison with other Malaysian and International 
Studies
This research assessed equity of health care financing in
Malaysia employing Kakwani's progressivity index. It rep-
resents the first study to measure progressivity of each of
the finance sources and the whole financing system in
Malaysia in a comprehensive manner. An alternative
methodology, fair financing was measured by the WHO
in the World Health Report 2000. With a fairness of finan-
cial contribution index of 0.917 (with an uncertainty
interval of possible scores between 0.881 to 0.948),
Malaysia was ranked at 122–123 from 191 member coun-
tries. Subsequently, the MOH Malaysia measured the sim-
ilar fairness of financial contribution index using the HES
Malaysia 1998/99 with complementary data sources and
found that the fairness of financial contribution index was
0.982 [24]. It was very close to 1 of perfect equality, which
indicates that the financial contribution in Malaysia is
fairly and equally distributed. Clearly, the MOH's index
was much higher than the 0.917 stated in the World
Health Report 2000, which was presumably due to the
different data sources used (1980's Malaysian HES versus
1998/99 HES). Additionally, given that the fairness of
financial contribution index has been criticised as being
unable to distinguish between health financing system
that are regressive from those that are progressive [25], it
would be beneficial to use Kakwani's index as an alterna-
tive index to assess the equity in health care financing in
Malaysia. Furthermore, the progressive results from the
Kakwani's index demonstrates equitable financing in the
Malaysian health financing system, whilst also confirming
the applicability of Kakwani's index in another WHO
member country.
Apart from Malaysia, five country-specific studies have
been reported for Australia [26], Finland [27], Italy [28],
the Netherlands [29] and Hungary [30]. Additionally,
comparative studies have been carried out in assessing
equity in health care financing in 14 OECD countries [31-
34], three South Asian countries [35], and 13 Asian coun-
tries [22]. All of the Kakwani's indices in 29 countries,
including Malaysia, are summarised in Table 7. Countries
are grouped into tax financed, social insurance, private
insurance or out-of-pocket payments, based on their main
finance sources. Tax financed systems were regressive in
Denmark, Sweden and Portugal. The regressivity of tax
financed systems was attributed to a heavy reliance on the
nearly proportional local income tax (in Denmark and
Sweden) and a high proportion of regressive out-of-
pocket payments (in Portugal). Contradictory progressive
results were found for Malaysia, Thailand and Hong
Kong. This presumably reflects that these Asian countries
have progressive taxes that are channelled to fund govern-
ment services including public health services, whilst pri-
vate health services are accessed discriminately by the
affluent. The tax financed system was progressive in
Malaysia because of its heavy reliance on the general gov-
ernment revenue that mainly consists of progressive direct
taxes. A significant contribution from progressive taxes
seems to be the prerequisite for any country striving
towards equitable tax financing. These Kakwani's indices
nonetheless merely serve as brief comparison because of
the incomparability in the methodology and data sources
(such as years of data) used in studies.
5.3 Policy Implications
The tax-financed system in Malaysia was progressive, indi-
cating that it was equitable. Equitable financing is in line
with the vision of a nation moving towards an egalitarian
society [36]. The structure of a tax-financed system and a
two tier delivery system (a mix of public and private pro-
viders) contributes to the equity of health care financing
in Malaysia. Households contribute progressively to direct
taxes but regressively towards indirect taxes, both of which
become general government revenue that are used to fund
public health services. All households enjoy public health
services that are mostly free, which are heavily relied upon
by the vulnerable. Households in active employment ben-
efited from their wages related savings in EPF (that can be
reimbursed for medical expenses) while those with low
income are protected by additional health plans provided
under SOCSO. The affluent conversely incurred out-of-
pocket payments, or covered by private insurance plans,
while purchasing private health services.
The parallel existence of public and private health services
permits the rich to voluntarily switch to the private health
services, whilst the poor rely on the public health services.
Private health services are seen as a luxury good relative to
highly subsidised public health services. While the popu-
lation suffered the 1997 Asian financial crisis, private hos-
pitals have experienced reduced utilisation, public health
services in contrast have experienced increased utilisation
of about 15% [6]. The switch of the affluent to private
health services is likely to diminish demand in the public
sector and reduce government's subsidies for the affluent.
Government subsidies could in turn be channelled to the
poor who rely on the public health services.
Collaboration from both the public and private sectors
was promoted by the government. The private sector is
encouraged to deliver appropriate health services to meet
population needs, instead of being solely profit-oriented.
The government views integration from both public andInternational Journal for Equity in Health 2008, 7:15 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/7/1/15
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private sector as important to ensure universal accessibil-
ity and comprehensive coverage of health care services [7].
Given that the health care financing is found to be equita-
ble in this research, the private sector could complement
the public sector in providing adequate coverage and in
facilitating accessibility whilst the public sector could con-
tinue to provide health care services through planning
and placement of public facilities.
Table 7: Kakwani's Indices of Financing Systems in 29 Countries
Countries, Year Proportion of main finance source (%) Kakwani's Indices Progressivity
Tax financed
Malaysia1, 1999 60.3 0.2166 Progressive
Thailand, 2000 (O'Donnell et al 2005) 56.3 0.1972
Hong Kong, 2000 (O'Donnell et al 2005) 55.6 0.1689
Sri Lanka2, 1997 (O'Donnell et al 2005) 49.5 0.0850 Mildly progressive
United Kingdom, 1993 (Wagstaff et al 1999) 64.0 0.0510
India (Punjab), 1996 (O'Donnell et al 2005) 40.7 0.0485
Australia, 1989 (Lairson et al 1995) 62.6 0.0100
Kyrgyzstan, 2000 (O'Donnell et al 2005) 44.5 0.0087
Finland, 1994 (Wagstaff et al 1999) 75.0 0.0050
Spain, 1990 (Wagstaff et al 1999) 56.3 0.0004
Denmark, 1987 (Wagstaff et al 1999) 84.7 -0.0047 Mildly regressive
Sweden, 1990 (Wagstaff et al 1999) 71.9 -0.0158
Portugal, 1990 (Wagstaff et al 1999) 55.2 -0.0445
Social insurance
Italy3, 1991 (Wagstaff et al 1999) 39.2 0.0413 Mildly progressive
France, 1989 (Wagstaff et al 1999) 73.6 0.0012
Belgium, 1997 (Wagstaff et al 1999) 42.1 -0.0001 Nearly proportional
Hungary, 1999 (Wagstaff et al 1999) 44.1 -0.0181 Mildly regressive
South Korea, 2000 (O'Donnell et al 2005) 33.9 -0.0239
Taiwan, 2000 (O'Donnell et al 2005) 51.8 -0.0292
West Germany, 1989 (O'Donnell et al 2005) 65.0 -0.0452
Japan, 2001 (O'Donnell et al 2005) 54.0 -0.0688
Netherlands, 1992 (Wagstaff et al 1999) 64.7 -0.0703
Private insurance
United States, 1987 (Wagstaff et al 1999) 29.2 -0.1303 Regressive
Switzerland, 1992 (Wagstaff et al 1999) 40.5 -0.1402
Out-of-pocket
Bangladesh, 1999 (Institute of Policy Studies 2002) 27.2 0.2142 Progressive
Indonesia, 2001 (O'Donnell et al 2005) 33.0 0.1732
Philippines, 1999 (O'Donnell et al 2005) 39.7 0.1631
Nepal, 1996 (O'Donnell et al 2005) 23.5 0.0625 Mildly progressive
China, 2000 (O'Donnell et al 2005) 14.9 0.0404
Note:
1The proportion of taxation based on the World Health Report 2006, in which government expenditure constitute 52.9% of the total health 
expenditure and 99% of this comes from revenue or taxation.
2 Kakwani's index calculated using consumption as the proxy for ability to pay, from the Equitap project.
3Italy is grouped under social insurance, based on the highest proportion of finance sources from social insurance.International Journal for Equity in Health 2008, 7:15 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/7/1/15
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In addition to equity, the efficiency of health care is also
closely related to the tax-financed system and the public
private provision mix. The efficiency of public health serv-
ices are monitored by the MOH with performance indica-
tors, whilst the private health services are regulated by
Private Healthcare Facilities and Services Act 1998. The
public health services, which are almost fully subsidised
by the government, place competitive pressure on private
health providers to set a reasonable price and to be effi-
cient.
5.4 Improving Equity
The progressivity of the whole health financing system
depends upon the progressivity of finance sources, which
is the distribution of health care costs across deciles within
any single finance source. The five finance sources have
quite different distributional consequences. Theoretically,
the progressivity of a finance source will be improved by
shifting the financial burden towards the rich. For
instance, a progressive income tax schedule (with lower
tax rates on low income groups and higher tax rates on
higher income groups) and high sales tax rates on luxury
goods place greater financial burden on the rich than the
poor. A high tax rate on the high earners nonetheless
would not provide incentives for active employment. Cor-
respondingly, high sales tax rates on luxury goods would
impede the market performance of luxury goods. Increas-
ing the progressivity of direct taxes or decreasing the
regressivity of indirect taxes would, nonetheless, involve
revamping the whole tax structure. The progressivity of
the EPF schedule will alternatively be improved by a pro-
gressive EPF schedule, rather than a uniform flat rate. The
regressivity of SOCSO contribution will be reduced by the
enrolment of high income groups to the scheme. Not-
withstanding, it contradicts with the SOCSO's philosophy
of protecting low income employees.
Equity can be improved by changing the financing mix as
well as improving the progressivity of the finance sources.
Both characteristics are important determinant of the final
distribution. Financing strategies with a shift towards
increased reliance on the four progressive finance sources
and reduced reliance on the regressive indirect taxes (such
as the extension of progressive EPF to encompass public
employees, the abolishment of upper income limit of
SOCSO members, and the promotion of progressive pri-
vate insurance and out-of-pocket payments as comple-
mentary finance sources) might potentially improve
equity in health care financing. The equity impact of
financing strategies can be monitored by measuring the
progressivity over time, in order to provide evidence in
implementing health financing policy. Financing strate-
gies that produced an increment in the Kakwani's index of
more than 0.10 (in line with its sensitivity within 0.10
provided that the ATP measure is held constant) are con-
sidered as of significant impacts and to be recommended
for policy consideration.
6. Conclusion
Private insurance and out-of-pocket payment are progres-
sive private finance sources in Malaysia. The World Health
Report 2006 [8] estimated that the total private finance
sources account for 41.8% of total health expenditure in
Malaysia. Private finance sources can be seen to constitute
a high proportion of total health expenditure in Malaysia.
Generally, private financing of health care is seen to be
undesirable from an equity point of view. The World
Health Report 2000 [9] stated that a high proportion of
private finance sources is likely to affect the equity of
financing because private health payments might impose
disproportionate financial burden on households. Private
financing of health care is said to impose high financial
burden on high risk groups, predominantly lower income
groups, given that the poor tend to have lower health sta-
tus and higher health risk [9]. Notwithstanding the pro-
gressive nature of private finance sources in Malaysia, a
growing share of private finance sources without sufficient
supports from public funding is likely to undermine
equity.
Direct taxes and contributions to EPF and SOCSO are pro-
gressive public finance sources. The World Health Report
2000 [9] stated that increased public financing of health
care was an integral part of the effort to achieve equity in
access. In other words, a growing share of direct tax, indi-
rect taxes and contribution to EPF and SOCSO is seen to
contribute to improved equity. This paper found that
indirect taxes and contributions to EPF and SOCSO were
progressive, indirect taxes were nonetheless regressive.
Within public financing, the shifts in favour of progressive
income taxes or EPF contribution would therefore lead to
a more equitable financing system.
In conclusion, it has been seen that the five finance
sources have produced a progressive system that is
regarded as equitable. Equity in health care financing was
achieved by the predominantly tax financed system with
the two tier delivery structure in Malaysia.
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Appendix 1
Estimates of Macro Weights with Three Incidence 
Assumption
The original macro weights in MNHA are shown in Addi-
tional file 1. These macro weights were derived from an
unpublished report (Ministry of Health 2005), which
contained the disaggregated macro weights required for
this research (only accessible for year 2003). Given that
Malaysia remains to be tax financing the health care sector
without any changes, the role of various sources for health
care funds have been maintained within the range of 48%
to 61% for public finance sources and 38% to 52% for pri-
vate finance sources throughout the 5 years (1998–2003).
Three of the five health payments made by the households
were matched to the categories of finance sources under
the MNHA classification. Out-of-pocket payments were
matched to private household out-of-pocket expenditure
whilst private insurance premiums were matched to pri-
vate insurance enterprise (other than social insurance),
both as private finance source in the MNHA. Contribu-
tions to EPF and SOCSO were matched to EPF and
SOCSO, as two distinct public finance sources in the
MMHA. Given that contributions to EPF and SOCSO are
captured together as a single expenditure in the HES
1998/99, the weights of EPF and SOCSO in the MNHA
were combined for analysis. In the MNHA, public finance
sources are mainly the MOH, Ministry of Education, local
authorities, other federal agencies (including statutory
bodies) and Ministry of Defence. Nevertheless, these pub-
lic finance sources are intermediaries that receive alloca-
tion from the Treasury. The Treasury collects taxes from
the population and corporations as government revenue,
which they use to fund public services.
In this paper, macro weights for the five finance sources
were generated based on the MNHA, whereby assump-
tions had to be made about the distribution of unallo-
cated finance sources. For private finance sources, it was
assumed that the three unallocated sources (private cor-
porations, private MCO and NGO) were distributed as a
weighted average of the two allocated sources (private
household out-of-pocket expenditures and private insur-
ance). This incidence assumption also means that Kak-
wani's index only measures the progressivity of the two
private finance sources which can be allocated down to
households.
In terms of public finance sources, most of the general
government revenue (financial intermediaries are MOH,
Ministry of Education, Local authorities, Federal agencies
and Ministry of Defence) are collected as taxes. Neverthe-
less, income tax and sales tax are the only two taxes that
can be allocated down to the households. The proportion
of direct taxes (represented by income taxes) and indirect
taxes (represented by sales taxes) is estimated from the
Eighth Malaysia Plan. The distribution of some taxes (for
example company taxes, petroleum taxes, export duties,
import duties and excise duties) is difficult to estimate
from the HES data. The same is true for non-tax revenue.
Assumptions were made about the distribution of unallo-
cated tax burden. The distribution of allocated taxes (such
as income taxes and sale taxes) is used to reflect the distri-
bution of unallocated taxes in some related way by mak-
ing different incidence assumptions. Macro weights with
different incidence assumptions are conducted by exam-
ining these three cases.
Additional file 2 shows the proportion of general govern-
ment revenue from the Eighth Malaysia Plan and the
weights of finance sources under three set of incidence
assumptions. In Case 1, it is assumed that direct taxes are
distributed as income taxes, indirect taxes are distributed
as sales taxes, and the remainder of unallocated revenues
are distributed as a weighted average of allocated taxes. In
Case 2, it is assumed that unallocated revenues are distrib-
uted as the weighted average of allocated taxes. In Case 3,
it is assumed that unallocated revenues are distributed as
a weighted average of all allocated payments, which also
means that Kakwani's indices only measure the progres-
sivity of those finance sources which can be allocated
down to households.
The macro weights for these three cases were created for
the sole purpose of calculating Kakwani's indices and
therefore do not represent the exact weights of finance
sources in the country. The incidence assumption in Case
1 was used as base-case analysis, whilst incidence assump-
tions of Case 2 and Case 3 were used as sensitivity analysis
to test how Kakwani's indices change when different inci-
dence assumptions are made on the distribution of unal-
located revenues.
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